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Abstract
In several reinforcement learning (RL) scenarios such as security settings,
there may be adversaries trying to interfere with the reward generating process
for their own benefit. We introduce Threatened Markov Decision Processes
(TMDPs) as a framework to support an agent against potential opponents in
a RL context. We also propose a level-k thinking scheme resulting in a novel
learning approach to deal with TMDPs. After introducing our framework and
deriving theoretical results, relevant empirical evidence is given via extensive
experiments, showing the benefits of accounting for adversaries in RL while
the agent learns.
Keywords: Markov Decision Process, Reinforcement Learning, Security
Games.
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, an increasing number of processes are being auto-
mated through the use of machine learning (ML) algorithms, being essential
that these are robust and reliable, if we are to trust operations based on
their output. State-of-the-art ML algorithms perform extraordinarily well
on standard data, but recently they have been shown to be vulnerable to
adversarial examples, data instances specifically targeted at fooling algorithms
[1]. As a fundamental underlying hypothesis, these ML developments rely on
the use of independent and identically distributed data for both the training
and test phases, [2]. However, security aspects in ML, which form part of
the field of adversarial machine learning (AML), questions the previous iid
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data hypothesis given the presence of adaptive adversaries ready to modify
the data to obtain a benefit; consequently, the training and test distributions
phases might differ. Therefore, as reviewed in [3], there is a need to model
the actions of other agents.
Stemming from the pioneering work in adversarial classification (AC)
in [4], the prevailing paradigm used to model the confrontation between
adversaries and learning-based systems in AML has been game theory, [5],
see the recent reviews [6] and [7]. This entails well-known common knowledge
hypothesis, [8], which, from a fundamental point of view, are not sustainable
in security applications as adversaries tend to hide and conceal information.
In recent work [9], we have presented a novel framework for AC based on
Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) [10]. ARA provides one-sided prescriptive
support to an agent, maximizing her expected utility, treating the adversaries’
decisions as random variables. To forecast them, we model the adversaries’
problems. However, our uncertainty about their probabilities and utilities is
propagated leading to the corresponding random optimal adversarial decisions
which provide the required forecasting distributions. ARA makes operational
the Bayesian approach to games, as presented in [11] or [12], facilitating a
procedure to predict adversarial decisions.
The AML literature has predominantly focused on the supervised setting
[6]. Our focus in this paper will be in reinforcement learning (RL). In it,
an agent takes actions sequentially to maximize some cumulative reward
(utility), learning from interactions with the environment. With the advent
of deep learning, deep RL has faced an incredible growth [13, 14]. However,
the corresponding systems may be also targets of adversarial attacks [15, 16]
and robust learning methods are thus needed. A related field of interest is
multi-agent RL [17], in which multiple agents try to learn to compete or
cooperate. Single-agent RL methods fail in these settings, since they do not
take into account the non-stationarity arising from the actions of the other
agents. Thus, opponent modelling is a recent research trend in RL, see the
Section 2 for a review of related literature. Here we study how the ARA
framework may shed light in security RL and develop new algorithms.
One of the main contributions of the paper is that of introducing TMDPs,
a framework to model adversaries that interfere with the reward generating
processes in RL scenarios, focusing in supporting a specific agent in its
decision making process. In addition, we provide several strategies to learn an
opponent’s policy, including a level-k thinking scheme and a model averaging
algorithm to update the most likely adversary. To showcase its generality, we
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evaluate our framework in diverse scenarios such as matrix games, a security
gridworld game and security resource allocation games. We also show how our
framework compares favourably versus a state of the art algorithm, WoLF-
PHC. Unlike previous works in multi-agent RL that focus on a particular
aspect of learning, we propose a general framework and provide extensive
empirical evidence of its performance.
2. Background and Related Work
Our focus will be on RL. It has been widely studied as an efficient
computational approach to Markov decision processes (MDP) [18], which
provide a framework for modelling a single agent making decisions while
interacting within an environment. We shall refer to this agent as the decision
maker (DM, she). More precisely, a MDP consists of a tuple pS,A, T , Rq
where S is the state space with states s; A denotes the set of actions a
available to the DM; T : S ˆ A Ñ ∆pSq is the transition distribution,
where ∆pXq denotes the set of all distributions over the set X; and, finally,
R : S ˆAÑ ∆pRq is the reward distribution modelling the utility that the
agent perceives from state s and action a.
In such framework, the aim of the agent is to maximize the long term
discounted expected utility
Eτ
« 8ÿ
t“0
γtRpat, stq
ff
(1)
where γ P p0, 1q is the discount factor and τ “ ps0, a0, s1, a1, . . .q is a trajectory
of states and actions. The DM chooses actions according to a policy pi : S Ñ
∆pAq, her objective being to find a policy maximizing (1). An efficient
approach to solving MDPs is Q-learning, [19]. With it, the DM maintains
a function Q : S ˆA Ñ R that estimates her expected cumulative reward,
iterating according to the update rule
Qps, aq :“ p1´ αqQps, aq ` α
´
rps, aq ` γmax
a1
Qps1, a1q
¯
, (2)
where α is a learning rate hyperparameter and s1 designates the state that the
agent arrives at, after having chosen action a in state s and received reward
rps, aq.
We focus on the problem of prescribing decisions to a single agent in
a non stationary environment as a result of the presence of other learning
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agents that interfere with her reward process. In such settings, Q-learning
may lead to suboptimal results, [17]. Thus, in order to support the agent, we
must be able to reason about and forecast the adversaries’ behaviour. Several
modelling methods have been proposed in the AI literature, as thoroughly
reviewed in [3]. We are concerned with the ability of our agent to predict her
adversary’s actions, so we restrict our attention to methods with this goal,
covering three main general approaches: policy reconstruction, type-based
reasoning and recursive learning. Methods in the first group fully reconstruct
the adversary’s decision making problem, generally assuming some parametric
model and fitting its parameters after observing the adversary’s behaviour.
A dominant approach, known as fictitious play [20], consists of modelling
the other agents by computing the frequencies of choosing various actions.
As learning full adversarial models could be computationally demanding,
type-based reasoning methods assume that the modelled agent belongs to one
of several fully specified types, unknown a priori, and learn a distribution over
the types; these methods may not reproduce the actual adversary behaviour as
none of them explicitly includes the ability of other agents to reason, in turn,
about its opponents’ decision making. Using explicit representations of the
other agents’ beliefs about their opponents could lead to an infinite hierarchy
of decision making problems, as illustrated in [21] in a much simpler class
of problems. Level-k thinking approaches [22] typically stop this potentially
infinite regress at a level in which no more information is available, fixing
the action prediction at that depth through some non-informative probability
distribution.
These modelling tools have been widely used in AI research but, to the
best of our knowledge, their application to Q-learning in multi-agent settings
remains largely unexplored. Relevant extensions have rather focused on
modelling the whole system through Markov games, instead of considering a
single DM’s point of view, as we do here. The three better-known solutions
include minimax-Q learning [23], where at each iteration a minimax problem
needs to be solved; Nash-Q learning [24], which generalizes the previous
algorithm to the non-zero sum case; or the friend-or-foe-Q learning [25], in
which the DM knows in advance whether her opponent is an adversary or a
collaborator. Within the bandit literature, [26] introduced a non-stationary
setting in which the reward process is affected by an adversary. Our framework
departs from that work since we explicitly model the opponent through several
strategies described below.
The framework we propose is related to the work of [27], in which the
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authors propose a deep cognitive hierarchy as an approximation to a response
oracle to obtain more robust policies. We instead draw on the level-k thinking
tradition, building opponent models that help the DM predict their behaviour.
In addition, we address the issue of choosing between different cognition levels
for the opponent. Our work is also related with the iPOMDP framework
in [28], though the authors only address the planning problem, whereas we
are interested in the learning problem as well. In addition, we introduce a
more simplified algorithmic apparatus that performs well in our problems of
interest. The work of [29] also addressed the setting of modelling opponents
in deep RL scenarios; however, the authors rely on using a particular neural
network architecture over the deep Q-network model. Instead, we tackle
the problem without assuming a neural network architecture for the player
policies, though our proposed scheme can be adapted to that setting. The
work [30] adopted a similar experimental setting to ours, but their methods
apply mostly when both players get to exactly know their opponents’ policy
parameters (or a maximum-likelihood estimator of them), whereas our work
builds upon estimating the opponents’ Q-function and does not require direct
knowledge of the opponent’s internal parameters.
In summary, all of the proposed multi-agent Q-learning extensions are
inspired by game theory with the entailed common knowledge assumptions [8],
which are not realistic in the security domains of interest to us. To mitigate
this assumption, we consider the problem of prescribing decisions to a single
agent versus her opponents, augmenting the MDP to account for potential
adversaries conveniently modifying the Q-learning rule. This will enable us to
adapt some of the previously reviewed modelling techniques to the Q-learning
framework, explicitly accounting for the possible lack of information about
the modelled opponent. In particular, we propose here to extend Q-learning
from an ARA [10] perspective, through a level-k scheme [22, 31].
3. Threatened Markov Decision Processes
In similar spirit to other reformulations of MDPs, such as Constrained
Markov Decision Processes [32] (in which restrictions along state trajectories
are considered) or Configurable Markov Decision Processes [33] (in which the
DM is able to modify the environment dynamics to accelerate learning), we
propose an augmentation of a MDP to account for the presence of adversaries
which perform their actions modifying state and reward dynamics, thus
making the environment non-stationary. In this paper, we mainly focus on
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the case of a DM (agent A, she) facing a single opponent (B, he). However,
we provide an extension to a setting with multiple adversaries in Section 3.4.
Definition 1. A Threatened Markov Decision Process (TMDP) is a tuple
pS,A,B, T , R, pAq in which S is the state space; A denotes the set of actions
available to the supported agent A; B designates the set of threat actions b, or
actions available to the adversary B; T : S ˆAˆB Ñ ∆pSq is the transition
distribution; R : S ˆ A ˆ B Ñ ∆pRq is the reward distribution, the utility
that the agent perceives from a given state s and a pair pa, bq of actions; and
pApb|sq models the DM’s beliefs about her opponent’s move, i.e., a distribution
over the threats for each state s P S.
In our approach to TMDPs, we modify the standard Q-learning update rule
(2) by averaging over the likely actions of the adversary. This way the DM
may anticipate potential threats within her decision making process, and
enhance the robustness of her decision making policy. Formally, we first
replace (2) by
Qps, a, bq :“ p1´ αqQps, a, bq`
` α
´
rps, a, bq ` γmax
a1
EpApb|s1q rQps1, a1, bqs
¯ (3)
where s1 is the state reached after the DM and her adversary, respectively,
adopt actions a and b from state s. We then compute its expectation over
the opponent’s action argument
Qps, aq :“ EpApb|sq rQps, a, bqs . (4)
We use the proposed rule to compute an ´greedy policy for the DM,
when she is at state s, i.e., choose with probability p1 ´ q the action
a˚ “ arg maxa rQps, aqs or a uniformly random action with probability .
Appendix A provides a proof of the convergence of the rule. Though in the
experiments we focus on such ´greedy strategy, other sampling methods can
be straightforwardly used, such as a softmax policy (see Appendix D.1 for
an illustration) to learn mixed strategies.
As we do not assume common knowledge, the agent will have uncertainty
regarding the adversary’s policy modelled by pApb|sq. However, we make the
standard assumption within multi-agent RL that both agents observe their
opponent’s actions (resp. rewards) after they have committed to them (resp.
received them). We propose two approaches to estimating the opponent’s
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policy pApb|sq under such assumption. We start with a case in which the
adversary is considered non-strategic, that is, he acts without awareness of
the DM, and then provide a level-k scheme. After that, in Section 3.3 we
outline a method to combine different opponent models, so we can deal with
mixed behavior.
3.1. Non-strategic opponent
Consider first a stateless setting. In such case, the Q-function (3) may
be written as Qpai, bjq, with ai P A the action chosen by the DM and bj P B
the action chosen by the adversary, assuming that A and B are discrete
action spaces. Suppose the DM observes her opponent’s actions after he has
implemented them. She needs to predict the action bj chosen by her opponent.
A typical option is to model her adversary using an approach inspired by
fictitious play (FP), [20]: she may compute the expected utility of action ai
using the stateless version of (4)
ψpaiq “ EpApbqrQpa, bqs “
ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bjqpApbjq,
where pApbjq reflects A’s beliefs about her opponent’s actions and is computed
using the empirical frequencies of the opponent past plays, with Qpai, bjq
updated according to (a stateless version of) (3). Then, she chooses the action
ai P A maximizing her expected utility ψpaiq. We refer to this variant as
FPQ-learning. Observe that while the previous approach is clearly inspired
by FP, it is not the same scheme, since only one of the players (the DM) is
using it to model her opponent, as opposed to the standard FP algorithm in
which all players adopt it.
As described in [34], adapting ARA to a game setting requires re-framing
FPQ-learning from a Bayesian perspective. Let pj “ pBpbjq be the probability
with which the opponent chooses action bj. We may place a Dirichlet prior
pp1, . . . , pnq „ Dpα1, . . . , αnq, where n is the number of actions available to
the opponent. Then, the posterior is Dpα1 ` h1, . . . , αn ` hnq, with hi being
the count of action bi, i “ 1, ..., n. If we denote its posterior density function
as fpp|hq, the DM would choose the action ai maximizing her expected utility,
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which adopts the form
ψpaiq “
ż »–ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bjqpj
fifl fpp|hqdp
“
ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bjqEp|hrpjs9
ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bjqpαj ` hjq.
The Bayesian perspective may benefit the convergence of FPQ-learning, as
we include prior information about the adversary behavior when relevant.
Generalizing the previous approach to account for states is straightforward.
The Q-function has now the form Qps, ai, bjq. The DM needs to assess
probabilities pApbj|sq, since it is natural to expect that her opponent behaves
differently depending on the state. The supported DM will choose her action
at state s by maximizing
ψspaiq “
ÿ
bjPB
Qps, ai, bjqpApbj|sq.
Since S may be huge, even continuous, keeping track of pApbj|sq may incur in
prohibitive memory costs. To mitigate this, we take advantage of Bayes rule
as pApbj|sq 9 pps|bjqppbjq. The authors of [35] proposed an efficient method
for keeping track of pps|bjq, using a hash table or approximate variants, such
as the bloom filter, to maintain a count of the number of times that an agent
visits each state; this is only used in the context of single-agent RL to assist
for a better exploration of the environment. We propose here to keep track
of n bloom filters, one for each distribution pps|bjq, for tractable computation
of the opponent’s intentions in the TMDP setting. This scheme may be
transparently integrated within the Bayesian paradigm, as we only need to
store an additional array with the Dirichlet prior parameters αi, i “ 1, . . . , n
for the ppbjq part. Note that, potentially, we could store initial pseudocount
as priors for each bj|s initializing the bloom filters with the corresponding
parameter values.
As a final comment, if we assume the opponent to have memory of
the previous stage actions, we could straightforwardly extend the above
scheme using the concept of mixtures of Markov chains [36], thus avoiding
an exponential growth in the number of required parameters and linearly
controlling model complexity. For example, in case the opponent belief model
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is pApbt|at´1, bt´1, stq, so that the adversary recalls the previous actions at´1
and bt´1, we could factor it through a mixture
pApbt|at´1, bt´1, stq “ w1pApbt|at´1q ` w2pApbt|bt´1q ` w3pApbt|stq,
with
ř
iwi “ 1, wi ě 0, i “ 1, 2, 3.
3.2. Level-k thinking
The previous section described how to model a non-strategic (level-0)
opponent. This can be relevant in several scenarios. However, if the opponent
is strategic, he may model our supported DM as a level-0 thinker, thus making
him a level-1 thinker. This chain can go up to infinity, so we will have to
deal with modelling the opponent as a level-k thinker, with k bounded by
the computational or cognitive resources of the DM.
To deal with it, we introduce a hierarchy of TMDPs in which TMDPki
refers to the TMDP that agent i needs to optimize, while considering its rival
as a level-pk ´ 1q thinker. Thus, we have the process:
• If the supported DM is a level-1 thinker, she optimizes TMDP1A. She
models B as a level-0 thinker (using Section 3.1).
• If she is a level-2 thinker, the DM optimizes TMDP2A and models B as
a level-1 thinker. Consequently, this “modelled” B optimizes TMDP1B,
and while doing so, he models the DM as level-0.
• In general, we have a chain of TMDPs:
TMDPkA Ñ TMDPk´1B Ñ TMDPk´2A Ñ ¨ ¨ ¨
Exploiting the fact that TMDPs correspond to repeated interaction settings
(and, by assumption, both agents observe all past decisions and rewards),
each agent may estimate their counterpart’s Q-function, Qˆk´1: if the DM is
optimizing TMDPkA, she will keep her own Q-function (we refer to it as Qk),
and also an estimate Qˆk´1 of her opponent’s Q-function. This estimate may
be computed by optimizing TMDPk´1B and so on until k “ 1. Finally, the top
level DM’s policy is given by
arg max
aik
Qkps, aik , bjk´1q,
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where bjk´1 is given by
arg max
bjk´1
Qˆk´1ps, aik´2 , bjk´1q,
and so on, until we arrive at the induction basis (level-1) in which the opponent
may be modelled using the FPQ-learning approach in Section 3.1. Algorithm
1 specifies the approach for a level-2 DM.
Therefore, we need to account for her Q-function, Q2, and that of her
opponent (who will be level-1), Qˆ1. Figure 1 provides a schematic view of
the dependencies.
Algorithm 1 Level-2 thinking update rule
Require: Q2, Qˆ1, α2, α1 (DM and opponent Q-functions and learning rates,
respectively).
Observe transition ps, a, b, rA, rB, s1q
Qˆ1ps, b, aq :“ p1´ α1qQˆ1ps, b, aq ` α1prB ` γmaxb1 EpBpa1|s1q
”
Qˆ1ps1, b1, a1q
ı
q
Compute B’s estimated ´greedy policy pApb|s1q from Qˆ1ps, b, aq
Q2ps, a, bq :“ p1´ α2qQ2ps, a, bq ` α2prA ` γmaxa1 EpApb1|s1q rQ2ps1, a1, b1qsq
Level-2 (DM, denoted as A)
Q2, pApb|sqø Level-1 (Adv., denoted as B)
Qˆ1, pBpa|sqø Level-0 (DM)
Figure 1: Level-k thinking scheme, with k “ 2
Note that in the previous hierarchy of policies the decisions are obtained
in a greedy manner, by maximizing the lower level Qˆ estimate. We may gain
insight in a Bayesian fashion by adding uncertainty to the policy at each level.
For instance, at a certain level in the hierarchy, we could consider ´greedy
policies that with probability 1´  choose an action according to the previous
scheme and, with probability , select a random action. Thus, we may impose
distributions pkpq at each level k of the hierarchy. The mean of pkpq may
be an increasing function with respect to the level k to account for the fact
that uncertainty is higher at the upper thinking levels.
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3.3. Combining Opponent Models
We have discussed a hierarchy of opponent models. In most situations the
DM will not know which type of particular opponent she is facing. To deal
with this, she may place a prior ppMiq denoting her beliefs that her opponent
is using a model Mi, for i “ 1, . . . ,m, the range of models that might describe
her adversary’s behavior, with
řm
i“0 ppMiq “ 1.
As an example, she might place a Dirichlet prior. Then, at each iteration,
after having observed her opponent’s action, she may update her belief ppMiq
by increasing the count of the model Mi which caused that action, as in the
standard Dirichlet-Categorical Bayesian update rule (Algorithm 2). This is
possible since the DM maintains an estimate of the opponent’s policy for
each opponent model Mi, denoted pMipb|sq. If none of the opponent models
had predicted the observed action bt, then we may not perform an update
(as stated in Algorithm 2 and done in the experiments) or we could increase
the count for all possible actions.
Algorithm 2 Opponent average updating
Require: ppM |Hq9 pn1, n2, . . . , nmq, where H is the sequence
pb0, b1, . . . , bt´1q of past opponent actions.
Observe transition pst, at, bt, rA,t, rB,t, st`1q.
For each opponent model Mi, set b
i to be the predicted action by model
Mi.
If bi “ bt then update posterior:
ppM |pH||btqq9 pn1, . . . , ni ` 1, . . . , nmq
Note that this model averaging scheme subsumes the framework of cogni-
tive hierarchies [37], since a belief distribution is placed over the different levels
of the hierarchy. However, it is more flexible since more kinds of opponents
can be taken into account, for instance a minimax agent as exemplified in
[34].
3.4. Facing multiple opponents
TMDPs may be extended to the case of a DM facing more than one
adversary. Then, the DM would have uncertainty about all of her opponents
and she would need to average her Q-function over all likely actions of all
adversaries. Let pApb1, . . . , bM |sq represent the DM’s beliefs about her M
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adversaries’ actions. The extension of the TMDP framework to multiple
adversaries will require to account for all possible opponents in the DM’s Q
function taking the form Qps, a, b1, . . . , bMq. Finally, the DM would need to
average this Q over b1, . . . , bM in (3) and proceed as in (4).
In case the DM is facing non-strategic opponents, she could learn pApb1, . . . ,
bM |sq in a Bayesian way, as explained in Section 3.1. This would entail
placing a Dirichlet prior on the nM dimensional vector of joint actions of all
adversaries. However, keeping track of those probabilities may be unfeasible
as the dimension scales exponentially with the number of opponents. The
case of conditionally independent adversaries turns out to be much simpler
as we can use the fact that pApb1, . . . , bM |sq “ pApb1|sq ¨ . . . pApbM |sq. In this
case, we could learn each pApbi|sq for i “ 1, . . . ,M separately, as explained in
previous sections.
3.5. Computational complexity
As described before, a level-k Q-learner has to estimate the Q function of
a level-pk´ 1q Q-learner, and so on. Assuming the original Q-learning update
rule has time complexity OpT p|A|qq, with T being a factor depending on the
number of actions of the DM, the update rule from Algorithm 1 has time
complexity OpkT pmaxt|A|, |B|uqq, i.e., linear in the level of the hierarchy.
Regarding space complexity, the overhead is also linear in the level k since
the DM only needs to store k Q-functions, so the complexity is OpkMp|S|, |A|¨
|B|qq with Mp|S|, |A| ¨ |B|q accounting for the memory needed to store the
Q-function in tabular form.
4. Experiments and Results
To illustrate the TMDP reasoning framework, we consider three sets
of experiments: repeated matrix games, with and without memory; the
adversarial security environment proposed in [38]; and a security resource
allocation problem in the form of a Blotto game. The first set of experi-
ments allows us to illustrate several relevant computational properties of our
framework, whereas the second one illustrates relevant security games, our
area of interest, and the last set illustrate how our framework deals with
structured action spaces and multiple adversaries. All the code is released at
https://github.com/vicgalle/ARAMARL, which includes full experimental
setup details summarized in Appendix C.
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4.1. Repeated Matrix Games
We first consider experiments with agents without memory, then agents
with memory, and, finally, discuss general conclusions. As initial baseline,
we focus on the stateless version of a TMDP and analyze the policies learnt
by the DM, and analyze the policies learnt by the DM, who will be the row
player in the corresponding matrix game, against various kinds of opponents.
In all the iterated games, agent i P tA,Bu aims at optimizing ř8t“0 γtrit, and
we set the discount factor γ “ 0.96 for illustration purposes.
4.1.1. Memoryless Repeated Matrix Games
We consider the classical Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), [39]. Table
1 shows its reward bimatrix. Recall that, in this game, the Nash equilibrium
is (D,D).
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of Prisoners’ Dilemma
C D
C (-1, -1) (-3, 0)
D (0, -3) (-2, -2)
To start with, consider the opponent to be an independent-Q learner (i.e.,
he uses the standard Q-function from single-agent RL and (2) as learning
rule). Fig. 2 depicts the utilities obtained over time by both players, in cases
where we model our DM as an independent Q-learner, Fig. 2(a), or as a
FPQ-learner, Fig. 2(b). An opponent-unaware DM would remain exploitable
by another adversary (i.e., independent Q-learning does not converge to
the Nash equilibria). Observe also that in Fig. 2(a) the variance is much
bigger due to the inability of the basic Q-learning solution to deal with a
non-stationary environment. In contrast, the level-1 FPQ-learner converges
to the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the DM reaches the equilibrium strategy
first, becoming stationary to her opponent, and thus pulling him to play
towards the equilibrium strategy. Note that the FPQ-learner is unable to
learn to cooperate with her opponent, achieving lower rewards than her naive
counterpart. This is due to the specification of the environment and not to a
limitation of our framework since, as we shall see in Section 4.1.2, the same
agent with memory of past actions is able to cooperate with its opponent,
when solving the previous problem.
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(a) Q-learner vs Q-learner (b) FPQ-learner (blue) vs Q-learner (red)
Figure 2: Rewards obtained in IPD. We plot the trajectories of 10 simulations with shaded
colors. Darker curves depict mean rewards.
(a) Q-learner vs Q-learner (b) FPQ-learner (blue) vs Q-learner (red)
Figure 3: Rewards in ISH game
(a) Q-learner vs Q-learner (b) FPQ-learner (blue) vs Q-learner (red)
Figure 4: Rewards in IC game
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We turn to another social dilemma game, the Stag Hunt game, in which
both agents must coordinate to maximize their rewards. They payoff matrix
is in Table 2, with two Nash equilibria (C,C) and (D,D). We designate its
iterated version ISH. We use the same experimental setting as before and
report results in Figure 3.
Table 2: Payoff Matrix of Stag Hunt
C D
C (2, 2) (0, 1)
D (1, 0) (1, 1)
Once again, the independent learning solution cannot cope with the non-
stationarity of the environment and oscillates between both equilibria without
clear convergence to one of them (Fig. 3(a)). On the other hand, the FPQ-
learner converges quite rapidly to the socially optimal policy (Fig. 3(b)).
Then, the environment becomes essentially stationary to its opponent, who
also converges to that policy.
The last social dilemma that we consider is the Chicken game, with payoff
matrix in Table 3. It has two pure Nash equilibria (C, D) and (D,C). We
designate its iterated variant by IC.
Table 3: Payoff Matrix of Chicken
C D
C (0, 0) (-2, 1)
D (1, -2) (-4, -4)
Figure 4(a) depicts again the ill convergence due to lack of opponent awareness
in the independent Q-learning case; note that the instabilities continued
cycling even after the limit in the displayed graphics. Alternatively, the DM
with opponent modelling has an advantage and converges to her optimal Nash
equilibrium (D,C) (Fig. 4(b)).
In addition, we study another kind of opponent to show how our framework
can adapt to it. We consider an adversary that learns according to the WoLF-
PHC algorithm [40], one of the best learning approaches in the multi-agent
reinforcement learning literature. Figure 5(a) depicts a FPQ-learner (level-1)
against this adversary, where the latter clearly exploits the former. However,
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(a) FPQ-learner (blue) vs WoLF-learner (red)(b) L2Q-learner (blue) vs WoLF-learner (red)
Figure 5: Rewards obtained in the IC game against a WoLF-PHC adversary.
if we go up in the level-k hierarchy and model our DM as a level-2 Q-learner,
she outperforms her opponent (Fig. 5(b)).
4.1.2. Repeated Matrix Games With Memory
Section 4.1.1 illustrated the ability of the modelled agents to effectively
learn Nash equilibrium strategies in several iterated games. However, if we
let agents have memory of previous movements, other types of equilibria may
emerge, including those in which agents cooperate. We can easily augment the
agents to have memory of the past T joint actions taken. However, [41] proved
that, in the IPD, agents with a good memory-1 strategy can effectively force
the iterated game to be played as memory-1, ignoring longer play histories.
Thus, we resort to memory-1 iterated games.
We restrict our attention to the IPD. We model the memory-1 IPD as a
TMDP in which the state S adopts the form st “ pat´1, bt´1q, t ą 0 describing
the previous joint action, plus the initial state s0 in which there is no prior
action. Note that now the DM’s policy is conditioned on S, and it is fully
specified by the probabilities pipC|CCq, pipC|CDq, pipC|DCq, pipC|DDq, and
pipC|s0q.
We assume a stationary adversary playing Tit-For-Tat (TFT), i.e. replicating
the opponent’s previous action [39]. TFT is a Nash equilibrium in the IPD
with memory. We aim at showing that the supported DM is able to learn the
equilibrium strategy.
In the experiments, the adversary will compete with either an agent
playing FP (the same from the stateless environment), or with a memory-1
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Figure 6: Rewards obtained by the DM for players: FPQ memoryless player vs TFT player
(G1) and FPQ memory-1 player vs TFT player (G2).
agent also playing FP. Figure 6 represents the utilities attained by these
agents in both duels. As can be seen, a memoryless FPQ player cannot
learn an optimal policy and forces the TFT agent to play defect. In contrast,
augmenting this agent to have memory of the previous move allows him to
learn the optimal policy (TFT), that is, he learns to cooperate, leading to a
higher cumulative reward.
4.1.3. Discussion
We have shown through our examples some qualitative properties of the
proposed framework. Explicitly modelling an opponent (as in the level-1 or
FPQ-learner) is beneficial to maximize the rewards attained by the DM, as
shown in the ISH and IC games. In both games, the DM obtains higher reward
as a level-1 thinker than as a naive Q-learner against the same opponent.
Also, going up in the hierarchy helps the DM to cope with more powerful
opponents such as the WoLF-PHC algorithm.
In the two previous games, a level-1 DM makes both her and her opponent
reach a Nash equilibrium, in contrast with the case in which the DM is a
naive learner, where clear convergence is not assured. In both games there
exist two pure Nash equilibria, and the higher-level DM achieved the most
profitable one for her, effectively exploiting her adversary.
The case of the IPD is specially interesting. Though the level-1 DM also
converges to the unique Nash equilibrium (Fig. 2(b)), it obtains less reward
than its naive counterpart (Fig. 2(a)). Recall that the naive Q-learner would
remain exploitable by another opponent. We argue that the FPQ-learner
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did not learn to cooperate, and thus achieves lower rewards, due to the
specification of the game and not as a limitation of our approach. To allow
for the emergence of cooperation in the IPD, agents should remember past
actions taken by all players. If we specify an environment in which agents
recall the last pair of actions taken, the FPQ-learner is able to cooperate (Fig.
6) with an opponent that plays a Nash optimum strategy in this modified
setting, Tit-For-Tat.
4.2. AI Safety Gridworlds and Markov Security Games
A suite of RL safety benchmarks has been recently introduced in [38]. We
focus on the safety friend or foe environment, in which the supported DM
needs to travel a room and choose between two identical boxes, hiding positive
and negative rewards, respectively. The reward assignment is controlled by
an adaptive opponent. Figure 7 shows the initial state in this game. The blue
cell depicts the DM’s initial state, gray cells represent the walls of the room.
Cells 1 and 2 depict the adversary’s targets, who decides which one will hide
the positive reward. This case may be interpreted as a spatial Stackelberg
game in which the adversary is planning to attack one of two targets, and
the defender will obtain a positive reward if she travels to the chosen target.
Otherwise, she will miss the attacker and will incur in a loss.
As shown in [38], a deep Q-network (and, similarly, the independent
tabular Q-learner as we show) fails to achieve optimal results because the
reward process is controlled by the adversary. By explicitly modelling it, we
actually improve Q-learning methods achieving better rewards. An alternative
approach to security games in spatial domains was introduced in [42]. The
authors extend the single-agent Q-learning algorithm with an adversarial
policy selection inspired by the EXP3 rule from the adversarial multi-armed
bandit framework in [26]. However, although robust, their approach does
not explicitly model an adversary. We demonstrate that by modelling an
opponent the DM can achieve higher rewards.
4.2.1. Stateless Variant
We first consider a simplified environment with a singleton state and two
actions. In a spirit similar to [38], the adaptive opponent estimates the DM’s
actions using an exponential smoother. Let p “ pp1, p2q be the probabilities
with which the DM will, respectively, choose targets 1 or 2 as estimated by the
opponent. At every iteration, the opponent updates his knowledge through
p :“ βp` p1´ βqa,
18
Figure 7: The friend or foe environment from the AI Safety Gridworlds benchmark. Figure
taken from [38].
where 0 ă β ă 1 is a learning rate, unknown from the DM’s point of view,
and a P tp1, 0q, p0, 1qu is a one-hot encoded vector indicating whether the
DM chose targets 1 or 2. We consider an adversarial opponent which places
the positive reward in target t “ arg minippqi. Initially, the opponent has
estimates p “ p0.5, 0.5q of the target preferred by the DM.
Since the DM has to deal with a strategic adversary, we introduce a
modification to the FP-Q learning algorithm that places more attention to
more recent actions. Leveraging the property that the Dirichlet distribution
is a conjugate prior of the Categorical distribution, a modified update scheme
is proposed in Algorithm 3. This approach essentially allows to account for
Algorithm 3 Dirichlet updating with forget factor
Initialize pseudocounts α0 “ pα01, . . . , α0nq
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
αt “ λαt´1 Ź Reweight with factor 0 ă λ ă 1
Observe opponent action bti, i P tb1, . . . , bnu
αti “ αt´1i ` 1 Ź Update posterior
αt´i “ αt´1´i
end for
the last 1
1´λ opponent actions, instead of weighting all observations equally.
For the case of a level-2 defender, as we do not know the actual rewards of
the adversary (who will be modelled as a level-1 learner), we model it as in a
zero-sum scenario, i.e. rB “ ´rA, making this case similar to the Matching
Pennies game. Other reward scalings for rB have been considered, though
they did not qualitatively affect the results (See Appendix D.3).
Results are displayed in Figure 8. We considered three types of defenders:
an opponent unaware Q-learner, a level-1 DM with forget (Algorithm 3) and a
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Figure 8: Rewards for the DM against the adversarial opponent
level-2 agent. The first one is exploited by the adversary achieving suboptimal
results. In contrast, the level-1 DM with forget effectively learns a stationary
optimal policy (reward 0). Finally, the level-2 agent learns to exploit the
adaptive adversary achieving positive rewards.
Note that the actual adversary behaves differently from how the DM
models him, i.e. he is not exactly a level-1 Q-learner. Even so, modelling him
as a level-1 agent gives the DM sufficient advantage.
4.2.2. Facing more powerful adversaries
Until now the DM has interacted against an exponential smoother adver-
sary, which may be exploited if the DM is a level-2 agent. We study now the
outcome of the process if we consider more powerful adversaries.
First of all, we parameterize our opponent as a level-2 Q-learner, instead
of the exponential smoother. To do so, we specify the rewards he shall
receive as rB “ ´rA, i.e., for simplicity we consider a zero-sum game, yet our
framework allows for the general-sum case. Figure 9(a) depicts the rewards
for both the DM (blue) and the adversary (red). We have computed the
frequency for choosing each action, and both players select either action with
probability 0.5˘ 0.002 along 10 different random seeds. Both agents achieve
the Nash equilibrium, consisting of choosing between both actions with equal
probabilities, leading to an expected cumulative reward of 0, as shown in the
graph.
Increasing the level of our DM to make her level-3, allows her to exploit
a level-2 adversary, Fig. 9(b). However, this DM fails to exploit a level-1
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(a) L2Q-learner (blue) vs L2Q-learner (red) (b) L3Q-learner (blue) vs L2Q-learner (red)
(c) L3Q-learner (blue) vs L1Q-learner (red)(d) L3Q-learner with opponent averaging
(blue) vs L1Q-learner (red)
(e) Estimate of PL1Q: DM’s belief that her
opponent is a level-1 Q-learner
Figure 9: Rewards obtained against the exponential smoother adversary.
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opponent (i.e., a FPQ-learner), Fig. 9(c). The explanation to this apparent
paradox is that the DM is modelling her opponent as a more powerful agent
than he actually is, so her model is inaccurate and leads to poor performance.
However, the previous “failure” suggests a potential solution to the problem
using type-based reasoning, Section 3.3. Figure 9(d) depicts the rewards
of a DM that keeps track of both level-1 and level-2 opponent models and
learns, in a Bayesian manner, which one is she actually facing. The DM keeps
estimates of the probabilities PL1Q and PL2Q that her opponent is acting as if
he was a level-1 or a level-2 Q-learner, respectively. Figure 9(e) depicts the
evolution of PL1Q, and we can observe that it places most of the probability
in the correct opponent type.
4.2.3. Spatial Variant
We now compare the independent Q-learner and a level-2 Q-learner against
the same adaptive opponent (exponential smoother) in the spatial gridworld
domain, see Fig. 7. Target rewards are delayed until the DM arrives at one
of the respective locations, obtaining ˘50 depending on the target chosen
by the adversary. Each step is penalized with a reward of -1 for the DM.
Results are displayed in Figure 10(a). Once again, the independent Q-learner
is exploited by the adversary, obtaining even more negative rewards than in
Figure 8 due to the penalty taken at each step. In contrast, the level-2 agent
is able to approximately estimate the adversarial behavior, modelling him
as a level-1 agent, thus being able to obtain positive rewards. Figure 10(b)
depicts rewards of a DM that keeps opponent models for both level-1 and
level-2 Q-learners. Note that although the adversary is of neither class, the
DM achieves positive rewards, suggesting that the framework is capable of
generalizing between different model opponents.
4.3. TMDPs for Security Resource Allocation
We illustrate the multiple opponent concepts of Section 3.4 introducing a
novel suite of resource allocation experiments which are relevant in security
settings. We propose a modified version of Blotto games [43]: the DM needs
to distribute limited resources over several positions which are susceptible of
being attacked. In the same way, each of the attackers has to choose different
positions where they can deploy their attacks. Associated with each of the
attacked positions there is a positive (negative) reward of value 1 (-1). If
the DM deploys more resources than the attacks deployed in a particular
position, she wins the positive reward; the negative reward will be equally
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(a) Rewards for various DM models (b) Rewards for a DM with opponent models
for a L1 Q-learner and a L2 Q-learner (red)
Figure 10: Rewards against the adversarial (exponential smoother) opponent in the spatial
environment.
divided between the attackers that chose to attack that position. If the DM
deploys less resources, she will receive the negative reward and the positive
one will be equally divided between the corresponding attackers. In case of a
draw in a given position, no player receives any reward.
We compare the performance of a FPQ-learning agent and a standard
Q-learning agent, facing two independent opponents that are both using
exponential smoothing to estimate the probability of the DM placing a
resource at each position, and implementing the attack where this probability
is the smallest (obviously both opponents perform exactly the same attacks).
To that end, we consider the problem of defending three different positions.
The DM needs to allocate two resources among the different positions. As
can be seen in Fig. 11, the FPQ-learning is able to learn the opponents
strategy and thus is less exploitable than the standard Q-learning agent. This
experiment showcases the suitability of the framework to deal with multiple
adversaries.
5. Conclusions and Further Work
We have introduced TMDPs, a novel reformulation of MDPs. This is an
original framework to support decision makers who confront opponents that
interfere with the reward generating process in RL settings. TMDPs aim
at providing one-sided prescriptive support to a RL agent, maximizing her
expected utility, taking into account potential negative actions adopted by
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Figure 11: Rewards for the DM against the adversarial opponent
an adversary. Some theoretical results are provided. In particular, we prove
that our proposed learning rule is a contraction mapping so that we may use
RL convergence results. In addition, the proposed framework is suitable for
using existing opponent modelling methods within Q-learning. Indeed, we
propose a scheme to model adversarial behavior based on level-k reasoning
about opponents. We extend this approach using type-based reasoning to
account for uncertainty about the opponent’s level.
Empirical evidence is provided via extensive experiments, with encouraging
results, namely the ability of the TMDP formalism to achieve Nash equilibria
in repeated matrix games with an efficient computational scheme, as well as
promote cooperation. In security settings, we provide empirical evidence that
by explicitly modelling a finite set of adversaries via the opponent averaging
scheme, the supported DM can take advantage of her actual opponent, even
when he is not explicitly modelled by a component from the finite mixture.
This highlights the ability of the proposed framework to generalize between
different kinds of opponents. As a general lesson, we find that a level-2 Q-
learner effectively deals with a wide class of adversaries. However, maintaining
a mixture of different adversaries is necessary if we consider a level-3 DM. As
a rule of thumb, the supported DM may start at a low level in the hierarchy,
and switch to a level-up temporarily, to check if the obtained rewards are
higher. Otherwise, she may continue on the initial, lower level.
Several lines of work are possible for further research. First of all, in
the experiments, we have just considered up to level-3 DMs, though the
extension to higher order adversaries is straightforward. In recent years
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Q-learning has benefited from advances from the deep learning community,
with breakthroughs such as the deep Q-network (DQN) which achieved super-
human performance in control tasks such as the Atari games [13], or as
inner blocks inside systems that play Go [14]. Integrating these advances
into the TMDP setting is another possible research path. In particular, the
proposed Algorithm 1 can be generalized to account for the use of deep
Q-networks instead of tabular Q-learning as presented here. We show details
of the modified algorithm in Appendix B. Indeed, the proposed scheme
is model agnostic, i.e., it does not matter if we represent the Q-function
using a look-up table or a deep neural network, so we expect it to be usable
in both shallow and deep multi-agent RL settings. In addition, there are
several other ways to model the adversary’s behavior that do not require to
learn opponent Q-values, for instance by using policy gradient methods [44].
Finally, it might be interesting to explore similar expansions to semi-MDPs,
in order to perform hierarchical RL or to allow for time-dependent rewards
and transitions between states.
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Appendix A. Sketch of proof of convergence of the update rule
for TDMPs (Eqs. (3) and (4))
Consider an augmented state space so that transitions are of the form
ps, bq aÝÑ ps1, b1q a1ÝÑ . . . .
Under this setting, the DM does not observe the full state since she does
not know the action b taken by her adversary. However, if she knows his
policy ppb|sq, or has a good estimate of it, she can take advantage of this
information.
Assume for now that we know the current opponent’s action b. The
Q-function would satisfy the following recursive update [19],
Qpips, a, bq “ řs1 řb1 pps1, b1|s, a, bq “Rabss1 ` Epipa1|s1,b1q rQpips1, a1, b1qs‰ ,
where we have taken into account explicitly the structure of the state space
and used Rabss1 “ E rrt`1|st`1 “ s1, st “ s, at “ a, bt “ bs. As the next oppo-
nent action is conditionally independent of his previous action, the previous
DM action and the previous state, given the current state, we may write
pps1, b1|s, a, bq “ ppb1|s1qpps1|s, a, bq. Thus
Qpips, a, bq “ řs1 pps1|s, a, bq “Rabss1 ` Eppb1|s1qEpipa1|s1,b1q rQpips1, a1, b1qs‰
as Rabss1 does not depend on the next opponent action b
1. Finally, the optimal
Q-function verifies
Q˚ps, a, bq “
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, a, bq
”
Rabss1 ` γmax
a1
Eppb1|s1q rQ˚ps1, a1, b1qs
ı
,
since in this case pipa|sq “ arg maxaQ˚ps, aq. Observe now that:
Lemma 1. Given q : S ˆ B ˆAÑ R, the operator H
pHqqps, b, aq “
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq“rps, b, aq ` γmax
a1
Eppb1|s1qqps1, b1, a1q
‰
.
is a contraction mapping under the supremum norm.
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Proof. We prove that }Hq1 ´Hq2}8 ď γ}q1 ´ q2}8.
}Hq1 ´Hq2}8 “
“ max
s,b,a
|
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq“rps, b, aq ` γmax
a1
Eppb1|s1qq1ps1, b1, a1q
´ rps, b, aq ´ γmax
a1
Eppb1|s1qq2ps1, b1, a1q
‰| “
“ γmax
s,b,a
|
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq“max
a1
Eppb1|s1qq1ps1, b1, a1q
´max
a1
Eppb1|s1qq2ps1, b1, a1q
‰| ď
“ γmax
s,b,a
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq|max
a1
Eppb1|s1qq1ps1, b1, a1q
´max
a1
Eppb1|s1qq2ps1, b1, a1q| ď
“ γmax
s,b,a
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aqmax
a1,z
|Eppb1|zqq1pz, b1, a1q
´ Eppb1|zqq2pz, b1, a1q| ď
“ γmax
s,b,a
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aqmax
a1,z,b1
|q1pz, b1, a1q ´ q2pz, b1, a1q| “
“ γmax
s,b,a
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq}q1 ´ q2}8 “
“ γ}q1 ´ q2}8.
Then, using the proposed learning rule (3), we would converge to the optimal
Q for each of the opponent actions. The proof follows directly from the
standard Q-learning convergence proof, see e.g. [45], and making use of the
previous Lemma.
However, at the time of making the decision, we do not know what action
he would take. Thus, we suggest to average over the possible opponent actions,
weighting each by ppb|sq, as in (4).
Appendix B. Generalization to deep-Q learning
The tabular version of Q-learning introduced in Algorithm 1 does not
scale well when the state or action spaces dramatically grow in size. To this
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end, we expand the framework to the case when the Q-functions are instead
represented using a function approximator, typically a deep Q-network [13].
Algorithm 4 shows the details. The parameters φA and φB refer to the weights
of the corresponding networks approximating the Q-values.
Algorithm 4 Level-2 thinking update rule using neural approximators.
Require: QφA , QφB , α2, α1 (DM and opponent Q-functions and learning
rates, respectively).
Observe transition ps, a, b, rA, rB, s1q.
φB :“ φB´α1 BQφBBφB ps, b, aq
“
QφBps, b, aq ´ prB ` γmaxb1 EpBpa1|s1qQφBps1, b1, a1qq
‰
Compute B’s estimated ´greedy policy pApb|s1q from QφBps, b, aq.
φA :“ φA´α2 BQφABφA ps, a, bq
“
QφAps, a, bq ´ prA ` γmaxa1 EpApb1|s1qQφAps1, a1, b1qq
‰
Appendix C. Experiment Details
We describe hyperparameters and other technical details used in the
experiments.
Repeated matrix games
Memoryless Repeated Matrix Games
In all three games (IPD, ISH, IC) we considered a discount factor γ “ 0.96,
a total of max steps T “ 20000, initial  “ 0.1 and learning rate α “ 0.3. The
FP-Q learner started the learning process with a Beta prior Bp1, 1q.
Repeated Matrix Games With Memory
In the IPD game we considered a discount factor γ “ 0.96, a total of max
steps T “ 20000, initial  “ 0.1 and learning rate α “ 0.05. The FP-Q learner
started the learning process with a Beta prior Bp1, 1q.
AI Safety Gridworlds
Stateless Variant
Rewards for the DM are 50,´50 depending on her action and the target
chosen by the adversary. We considered a discount factor γ “ 0.8 and a total
of 5000 episodes. For all three agents, the initial exploration parameter was
set to  “ 0.1 and learning rate α “ 0.1. The FP-Q learner with forget factor
used λ “ 0.8.
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Spatial Variant
Episodes end at a maximum of 50 steps or agent arriving first at target
1 or 2. Rewards for the DM are ´1 for performing any action (i.e., a step
in some of the four possible directions) or 50,´50 depending on the target
chosen by the adversary. We considered a discount factor γ “ 0.8 and a total
of 15000 episodes. For the level-2 agent, initial A “ B “ 0.99 with decaying
rules A :“ 0.995A and B :“ 0.9B every 10 episodes and learning rates
α2 “ α1 “ 0.05. For the independent Q-learner we set initial exploration rate
 “ 0.99 with decaying rule  :“ 0.995 every 10 episodes and learning rate
α “ 0.05.
TMDPs for Security Resource Allocation
For both the Q-learning and the FPQ-learning agents we considered a
discount factor γ “ 0.96,  “ 0.1 and a learning rate of 0.1.
Appendix D. Additional Results
Appendix D.1. Alternative policies
Although we have focused in pure strategies, dealing with mixed ones
is straightforward as it just entails changing the ´greedy policy with the
softmax policy.
In this Appendix we perform an experiment in which we replace the
´greedy policy of the DM with a softmax policy in the spatial gridworld
environment from Section 4.2. Actions at state s are taken with probability
proportional to Qps, aq. See Figure D.12 for several simulation runs of a level-
2 Q-learner versus the adversary, showing that indeed changing the policy
sampling scheme does not make the DM worse than its ´greedy alternative.
Appendix D.2. Robustness to hyperparameters
We perform several experiments in which we try different values of the
hyperparameters, just to highlight the robustness of the framework. Table
D.4 displays mean rewards (and standard deviations) for five different random
seeds, over different hyperparameters of Algorithm 1. Except in the case
where the initial exploration rate 0 is set to a high value (0.5, which makes
the DM to achieve a positive mean reward), the other settings showcase that
the framework (for the level-2 case) is robust to different learning rates.
29
Figure D.12: Rewards for the DM against the adversarial opponent, using a softmax policy.
Table D.4: Results on hyperparameter robustness of Algorithm 1 on the spatial gridworld.
α2 α1 0 Mean Reward
0.01 0.005 0.5 15.46˘ 47.21
0.01 0.005 0.1 40.77˘ 27.48
0.01 0.005 0.01 46.32˘ 16.15
0.01 0.02 0.5 15.58˘ 47.17
0.01 0.02 0.1 43.05˘ 23.65
0.01 0.02 0.01 47.81˘ 10.83
0.1 0.05 0.5 15.30˘ 47.27
0.1 0.05 0.1 42.82˘ 24.08
0.1 0.05 0.01 48.34˘ 8.10
0.1 0.2 0.5 15.97˘ 47.03
0.1 0.2 0.1 43.05˘ 23.66
0.1 0.2 0.01 48.51˘ 6.96
0.5 0.25 0.5 15.95˘ 47.04
0.5 0.25 0.1 43.06˘ 23.64
0.5 0.25 0.01 48.41˘ 7.68
0.5 1.0 0.5 15.19˘ 47.31
0.5 1.0 0.1 42.98˘ 23.71
0.5 1.0 0.01 48.53˘ 6.82
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(a) Rewards `1 and 0 for the adversary (b) Rewards `1 and ´1 for the adversary
Figure D.13: Rewards against the same adversary (exponential smoother) using different
reward scalings.
Appendix D.3. Robustness to reward scaling
For the experiments from Section 4.2.1 we tried other models for the
opponent’s rewards rB. Instead of assuming a minimax setting (rB “ ´rA),
where rB P t´50, 50u, we tried also two different scalings rB P t´1, 1u and
rB P t0, 1u. These alternatives are displayed in Figure D.13. We found that
they did not qualitatively affect the results.
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